By : Adv. Akanksha Srivastava

District Legal Advisor (Ghaziabad)

Justice & Rights Committee

Few cases in India travel as long a road as “Prajwala v. Union of India”. It began in 2004, when the Hyderabad-based anti-trafficking NGO Prajwala, founded by Dr. Sunitha Krishnan, filed a public interest writ petition pointing to the absence of any coherent rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration mechanism for victims of commercial sexual exploitation (CSE) in India.

In 2015, the Court disposed of that petition after the Union government assured it that a dedicated “Organised Crime Investigation Agency” (OCIA) would be functional by December 2016, and that a comprehensive anti-trafficking law would be drafted. Neither promise was kept in full- the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill was introduced, shelved, reintroduced, and left pending in Cabinet. In 2022, Prajwala returned to the Supreme Court through a Miscellaneous Application alleging non-compliance, and the matter was finally heard afresh before Justice Pardiwala and Justice Mahadevan, culminating in a nearly 300-page judgment delivered on 29 May 2026.

The Core Question: Is Prostitution Itself Illegal?

At the heart of the judgment lies a distinction that Indian law enforcement has long struggled with: the difference between “trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation” and “voluntary adult sex work”. The Court noted that the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) criminalises third parties- those who run brothels, live off the earnings of prostitution, or procure persons for it- but does “”not”” criminalise the act of prostitution itself when engaged in voluntarily by a consenting adult. Only associated activities like soliciting in public or operating a brothel attract penal consequences.

The Bench observed that treating everyone found in a raid as either an “innocent victim” or a “guilty participant”- with no space for a third, entirely lawful category of the willing adult sex worker- has allowed a moralistic binary to dictate legal outcomes. The judgment describes howthis framing lets law enforcement and society at large treat voluntary sex workers as less deserving of dignity simply because they are viewed as “immoral” or “fallen.”

When a police raid is conducted under Section 15 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, “all persons” found in the premises may be removed, regardless of whether they are engaged in prostitution voluntarily or have been forced into it. Similarly, under Section 16, a person may be rescued if there is reason to believe that they are in a brothel, but this provision also covers both those “who are carrying on prostitution by choice” and those “who are being compelled to do so”.

After the raid or rescue, these persons are produced before the Magistrate under Section 17. At this stage, the law does not clearly distinguish between different situations. Some individuals may have been trafficked and forced into prostitution against their will. Others may have been trafficked in the past but later chosen to continue in sex work voluntarily. There may also be individuals who entered sex work on their own, even though their decision may have been influenced by poverty, lack of opportunities, or other social and economic pressures.

Because the law treats all these individuals under the same legal framework, it often fails to recognize the important differences between their experiences and circumstances. Instead of distinguishing between victims of trafficking and adults who voluntarily engage in sex work, Section 17 processes them in a similar manner by broadly treating them as victims of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. This lack of differentiation has been criticized because it may undermine the autonomy of voluntary sex workers while also failing to provide tailored protection and rehabilitation for those who have actually been trafficked or coerced.

To correct this, the Court read Section 17 of the ITPA- the provision governing what happens to a person “rescued” in a raid- as requiring a “mandatory threshold inquiry” before any Magistrate. At the very first hearing, the Magistrate may now ask the persons: (i) whether the persons considers themsives to be engaged in prostitution of their own volition, free of coercion, fraud, or force, direct or indirect; and (ii) whether the persons wishe to be placed in protective custody at all. Only if there are indications of coercion, trafficking, or risk to safety can the machinery of detention and rehabilitation proceed further- and even then, theirinformed consent remains central to how rehabilitation is designed and delivered.

Cases Cited in the Judgment

The Court built its reasoning on a chain of earlier precedents:

Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal (2022) – Described in the judgment as the first ruling to squarely address the human rights of voluntary sex workers, holding that since sex work is not itself illegal, sex workers found during raids should not be arrested, detained, or victimised, and that rehabilitation must be voluntary, not coercive. “Prajwala” explicitly builds on and reaffirms this reasoning.

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) – Cited for the principle that the State’s constitutional obligations toward vulnerable persons extend beyond mere rescue to their continued welfare and dignity. The case emphasizes that Article 23 is not confined to actions by the State alone; it broadly prohibits traffic in human beings, begar, and all other similar forms of forced labour, regardless of whether such practices are carried out by the State or by private individuals.

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984)- Relied upon for the proposition that rehabilitation of persons freed from exploitative conditions is an integral part of the right to live with dignity.

Vishal Jeet v. Union of India, (1990)– An earlier trafficking-related judgment referenced in the case’s procedural history, out of which the original 2015 Central Advisory Committee process had emerged.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan– Referred to by commentators alongside “Prajwala” as earlier instances of the Supreme Court stepping in to frame binding, continuing-mandamus-style guidelines where legislative and executive action had failed.

Whatthe Judgment Actually Held on Consent

The Court’s central holding can be summarised in three constitutional threads:

• Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty): A voluntary adult sex worker’s decisional autonomy over her own body and livelihood is a facet of the right to live with dignity, which includes the right not to be treated as an object, access to material conditions for a meaningful life, and the right to be recognised as a person.
• Article 23 (Prohibition of Trafficking):Victims who have actually been trafficked are owed an affirmative right to rehabilitation by the State- shelter, medical care, psychological support, compensation, and vocational training- but this obligation cannot be discharged by forcing that rehabilitation on someone who does not want it.
• The rights of sex workers can exist without a right to sex work. The Court was careful to clarify that recognising the dignity and autonomy of a person already engaged in sex work is not the same as constitutionalising a right to enter sex work in the first place. It protects the person, not the trade.

Practical Directions Flowing From the Judgment

The Court did not stop at constitutional principle; it issued a binding, nationwide “Victim Protection Plan” covering every stage of an antitrafficking operation:

Pre-rescue: An end to unplanned, publicised “mass raids” as the default method of intervention, and mandatory sensitisation training for rescue teams.

Rescue: Mandatory presence of Female police officers and NGO workers, immediate separation of victims from traffickers, recovery of identity documents, and access to translators.

Post-rescue: Statements to be recorded only once the person is safe and psychologically stable, with confidentiality preserved throughout; no verbal or physical abuse and no unnecessary use of force by rescue officials, failing which the victim retains the right to prosecute them.

Rehabilitation and reintegration: Individualised plans built around the survivor’s own informed consent, with periodic follow-up to guard against re-trafficking.

Prosecution: Free legal aid, and sensitisation of prosecutors and judicial officers handling trafficking trials.

Notably, the Court declined to direct the creation of a separate Organised Crime Investigation Agency, on the ground that anti-trafficking functions are currently distributed across multiple existing institutions, leaving that policy choice to Parliament and the Union government.

Why This Matters

For two decades, India’s anti-trafficking framework operated on the assumption that anyone found in a red-light raid needed to be “rescued”whether the person wanted rescuing or not. “Prajwala v. Union of India” dismantles that assumption at its root. By requiring a magistrate to actually ask individuals what they want before deciding their fate, theCourt has shifted Indian law a significant step further toward treating adult, consensual sex work as what it has technically always been under the ITPA: not a crime, so long as it is engaged in willfully, without coercion, fraud, or force.By : Adv. Akanksha Srivastava

District Legal Advisor (Ghaziabad)

Justice & Rights Committee

Few cases in India travel as long a road as “Prajwala v. Union of India”. It began in 2004, when the Hyderabad-based anti-trafficking NGO Prajwala, founded by Dr. Sunitha Krishnan, filed a public interest writ petition pointing to the absence of any coherent rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration mechanism for victims of commercial sexual exploitation (CSE) in India.

In 2015, the Court disposed of that petition after the Union government assured it that a dedicated “Organised Crime Investigation Agency” (OCIA) would be functional by December 2016, and that a comprehensive anti-trafficking law would be drafted. Neither promise was kept in full- the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill was introduced, shelved, reintroduced, and left pending in Cabinet. In 2022, Prajwala returned to the Supreme Court through a Miscellaneous Application alleging non-compliance, and the matter was finally heard afresh before Justice Pardiwala and Justice Mahadevan, culminating in a nearly 300-page judgment delivered on 29 May 2026.

The Core Question: Is Prostitution Itself Illegal?

At the heart of the judgment lies a distinction that Indian law enforcement has long struggled with: the difference between “trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation” and “voluntary adult sex work”. The Court noted that the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) criminalises third parties- those who run brothels, live off the earnings of prostitution, or procure persons for it- but does “”not”” criminalise the act of prostitution itself when engaged in voluntarily by a consenting adult. Only associated activities like soliciting in public or operating a brothel attract penal consequences.

The Bench observed that treating everyone found in a raid as either an “innocent victim” or a “guilty participant”- with no space for a third, entirely lawful category of the willing adult sex worker- has allowed a moralistic binary to dictate legal outcomes. The judgment describes howthis framing lets law enforcement and society at large treat voluntary sex workers as less deserving of dignity simply because they are viewed as “immoral” or “fallen.”

When a police raid is conducted under Section 15 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, “all persons” found in the premises may be removed, regardless of whether they are engaged in prostitution voluntarily or have been forced into it. Similarly, under Section 16, a person may be rescued if there is reason to believe that they are in a brothel, but this provision also covers both those “who are carrying on prostitution by choice” and those “who are being compelled to do so”.

After the raid or rescue, these persons are produced before the Magistrate under Section 17. At this stage, the law does not clearly distinguish between different situations. Some individuals may have been trafficked and forced into prostitution against their will. Others may have been trafficked in the past but later chosen to continue in sex work voluntarily. There may also be individuals who entered sex work on their own, even though their decision may have been influenced by poverty, lack of opportunities, or other social and economic pressures.

Because the law treats all these individuals under the same legal framework, it often fails to recognize the important differences between their experiences and circumstances. Instead of distinguishing between victims of trafficking and adults who voluntarily engage in sex work, Section 17 processes them in a similar manner by broadly treating them as victims of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. This lack of differentiation has been criticized because it may undermine the autonomy of voluntary sex workers while also failing to provide tailored protection and rehabilitation for those who have actually been trafficked or coerced.

To correct this, the Court read Section 17 of the ITPA- the provision governing what happens to a person “rescued” in a raid- as requiring a “mandatory threshold inquiry” before any Magistrate. At the very first hearing, the Magistrate may now ask the persons: (i) whether the persons considers themsives to be engaged in prostitution of their own volition, free of coercion, fraud, or force, direct or indirect; and (ii) whether the persons wishe to be placed in protective custody at all. Only if there are indications of coercion, trafficking, or risk to safety can the machinery of detention and rehabilitation proceed further- and even then, theirinformed consent remains central to how rehabilitation is designed and delivered.

Cases Cited in the Judgment

The Court built its reasoning on a chain of earlier precedents:

Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal (2022) – Described in the judgment as the first ruling to squarely address the human rights of voluntary sex workers, holding that since sex work is not itself illegal, sex workers found during raids should not be arrested, detained, or victimised, and that rehabilitation must be voluntary, not coercive. “Prajwala” explicitly builds on and reaffirms this reasoning.

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) – Cited for the principle that the State’s constitutional obligations toward vulnerable persons extend beyond mere rescue to their continued welfare and dignity. The case emphasizes that Article 23 is not confined to actions by the State alone; it broadly prohibits traffic in human beings, begar, and all other similar forms of forced labour, regardless of whether such practices are carried out by the State or by private individuals.

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984)- Relied upon for the proposition that rehabilitation of persons freed from exploitative conditions is an integral part of the right to live with dignity.

Vishal Jeet v. Union of India, (1990)– An earlier trafficking-related judgment referenced in the case’s procedural history, out of which the original 2015 Central Advisory Committee process had emerged.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan– Referred to by commentators alongside “Prajwala” as earlier instances of the Supreme Court stepping in to frame binding, continuing-mandamus-style guidelines where legislative and executive action had failed.

Whatthe Judgment Actually Held on Consent

The Court’s central holding can be summarised in three constitutional threads:

• Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty): A voluntary adult sex worker’s decisional autonomy over her own body and livelihood is a facet of the right to live with dignity, which includes the right not to be treated as an object, access to material conditions for a meaningful life, and the right to be recognised as a person.
• Article 23 (Prohibition of Trafficking):Victims who have actually been trafficked are owed an affirmative right to rehabilitation by the State- shelter, medical care, psychological support, compensation, and vocational training- but this obligation cannot be discharged by forcing that rehabilitation on someone who does not want it.
• The rights of sex workers can exist without a right to sex work. The Court was careful to clarify that recognising the dignity and autonomy of a person already engaged in sex work is not the same as constitutionalising a right to enter sex work in the first place. It protects the person, not the trade.

Practical Directions Flowing From the Judgment

The Court did not stop at constitutional principle; it issued a binding, nationwide “Victim Protection Plan” covering every stage of an antitrafficking operation:

Pre-rescue: An end to unplanned, publicised “mass raids” as the default method of intervention, and mandatory sensitisation training for rescue teams.

Rescue: Mandatory presence of Female police officers and NGO workers, immediate separation of victims from traffickers, recovery of identity documents, and access to translators.

Post-rescue: Statements to be recorded only once the person is safe and psychologically stable, with confidentiality preserved throughout; no verbal or physical abuse and no unnecessary use of force by rescue officials, failing which the victim retains the right to prosecute them.

Rehabilitation and reintegration: Individualised plans built around the survivor’s own informed consent, with periodic follow-up to guard against re-trafficking.

Prosecution: Free legal aid, and sensitisation of prosecutors and judicial officers handling trafficking trials.

Notably, the Court declined to direct the creation of a separate Organised Crime Investigation Agency, on the ground that anti-trafficking functions are currently distributed across multiple existing institutions, leaving that policy choice to Parliament and the Union government.

Why This Matters

For two decades, India’s anti-trafficking framework operated on the assumption that anyone found in a red-light raid needed to be “rescued”whether the person wanted rescuing or not. “Prajwala v. Union of India” dismantles that assumption at its root. By requiring a magistrate to actually ask individuals what they want before deciding their fate, theCourt has shifted Indian law a significant step further toward treating adult, consensual sex work as what it has technically always been under the ITPA: not a crime, so long as it is engaged in willfully, without coercion, fraud, or force.